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Temporary Contracts and Monopsony Power  
in the UK Labour Market
* 
 
This paper addresses the applicability of the theory of equalizing differences (Rosen, 1987) in 
a market in which temporary and permanent workers co-exist. The assumption of perfect 
competition in the labour market is directly questioned and a model is developed in which the 
labour market is described as a duopsony and the relation between wage and non-monetary 
job characteristics is studied for workers with different contract lengths. The empirical 
analysis, based on several waves of the UK Labour Force Data, confirms several of the 
hypotheses suggested by the model and emphasizes how in the short run workers who have 
experienced a change in their employer can expect a career trajectory in line with the theory 
on compensating differentials. In particular, while the wage dynamic related to workers 
shifting from a temporary contract to another temporary position cannot be exactly predicted, 
shifts from temporary to permanent contracts tend to be linked to a reduction in wages and a 
simultaneous increase in travel-to-work distance. Nonetheless, when unobserved 
characteristics are accounted for in the selection process into temporary contracts, these 
results lose significance and only a positive relation between wage and commuting time 
persists, irrespective of the type of contract. 
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The aim of this paper is to examine the relationship between monopsony power and the use of
temporary contracts in the UK labour market. The motivation behind this study rests on the
simple observation that, ceteris paribus, temporary workers seem to face drastically dierent salaries,
working hours, benets, compared to their permanent colleagues and tend to report lower levels
of job satisfaction than permanent workers.1 This fact is not in line with what suggested by
the theory of equalizing dierences (Rosen (1987)). If holding a temporary contract is seen as a
disadvantage, according to the theory we should observe some wage dierentials that compensate for
this disamenity. In a more general framework, the lack of compensation for those workers enrolled
in undesirable job leads to doubt the possibility to assume that the labour market is perfectly
competitive.
Of course, the fact that the labour market cannot be seen as perfectly competitive is not a new
nding in economic studies,2 and several studies already deal with this issue.3 In recent years,
there have been new contributions on the extent of monopsony in the labour market (see Dewit
and Leahy (2009), Ransom and Oaxaca (2010) and Staiger, Spetz, and Phibbs (2010)), based on
a relatively rich literature that emerged in the 1990s with respect to specic American markets,4
as for the case of the public school teachers in Missouri (Ransom, Boal, and Beck (2000)), or that
of coal mining (as in Boal (1995)). In this paper, the focus is on the labour market as a whole
and monopsony power is studied through the investigation of the patterns of wages and commuting
time which relate to dierent kinds of workers. Travel-to-work time is introduced as a proxy for
the non-monetary characteristics of a job. This approach is closely linked to the work of Manning
(2004), which, starting from the model of Hotelling (1929), develops a theory that explicitly takes
monopsony into account by specifying a linear utility function of workers which presents a trade
o between wage and commuting time.5 The main result of Manning is relatively surprising, but
1See VV.AA. (2002), pp. 5-6. Evidence on these relationships is also presented in Section 2
2The term `monopsony' with respect to the labour market was rst used in 1969 by Joan Robinson, see Boal and
Ransom (1997), p.86.
3One of the most comprehensive studies in this eld is certainly Manning (2003). For a shorter review of the
literature see also Boal and Ransom (1997) and Bhaskar, A.Manning, and To (2002).
4See Ashenfelter, Farber, and Ransom (2010).
5Stutzer and Frey (2004) in analysing the loss of utility linked to commuting time in the German market base
their estimation of the utility function of the workers on the variable \How satised are you with your job". For a
critical analysis of the use of job and life satisfaction variables in economic research see Conti and Pudney (2008).
Among the studies on the link between monopsony power and travel-to-work time it is worth citing Falch and Stroem
(2006) and Latreille, Blackaby, Murphy, O'Leary, and Sloane (2006). Another example of this literature, related to
urban economics is given by Brueckner, Thisse, and Zenou (2002).
2rich in economic consequences: Commuting is only partially compensated by higher wages. This
result strongly questions the validity of theories based on perfect competition in labour markets.
In this respect, the main contribution of this paper lies in explicitly accounting for the contractual
dierences between the temporary and permanent segments of the labour market when testing for
the validity of the theory of compensating dierentials. The analysis of the link between temporary
contracts and monopsony power is performed by developing a simple duopsonistic model in which
heterogeneous workers are explicitly dierentiated on the basis of the duration of their contracts.
The theoretical implications of this approach are then empirically tested making use of a dataset
based on several waves of the UK Quarterly Labour Force Survey. The use of UK data is justied
because the proportion of temporary workers in the United Kingdom is stable and it is therefore not
strongly in
uenced by the business cycles. Table 1, which shows the percentages of temporary male
workers aged 15 to 65 employees in the years 1995-2004, conrms this claim. The characteristics of
the UK temporary workers have been eectively studied by Booth, Francesconi, and Frank (2000a)
and Booth, Francesconi, and Frank (2002).6 Their ndings depict temporary workers as young,
poorly experienced, low-trained employees. Interestingly, temporary workers are generally less
satised with their jobs than are permanents ones. Furthermore, the bulk of the research reveals
that holding a temporary contract can constitute a stepping stone to permanent work, but male
workers starting their careers in a xed-term position tend to experience a relevant wage penalty
when they move into a permanent position.7
This paper contributes to the literature by explicitly linking the use of temporary contracts to
the degree of competition that characterizes the labour market. In the proposed framework rms
rely on temporary contracts as a screening device for the ability of the employees without facing
the risk to lose the most protable workers. In fact, as the market is modeled as an oligopsonistic
one, workers have limited possibility to search for better contracts in terms of employment stability.
Although rms still compete against each other for securing the best workers, they exploit their
oligopsonistic power by oering them contractual conditions dierent from those that would be
implied by a perfectly competitive market.
6The amount of literature on the use of temporary contracts in the European Labour Markets is extremely
relevant. The emergence of a \two tier system" in several European labour markets for example as been studied by
Blanchard and Landier (2001), Berton and Garibaldi (2006), Boeri and Garibaldi (2007). In particular, the Spanish
case has been heavily studied. See Bentolila and Dolado (1994), Dolado, Garcia-Serrano, and Jimeno (2002), Kugler,
Jimeno, and Hernanz (2002), Guell and Petrongolo (2000).
7This last result is not found in all the studied markets: see Garcia-Perez and Bullon (2007).
3EU15 UK Spain France Germany Nether. Italy
1995 - 6.1 33.3 11.3 9.9 8.5 6
1996 11.1 5.9 32.0 11.4 11.0 9.0 6.5
1997 11.5 6.3 32.4 12.0 11.5 8.7 6.9
1998 12.1 5.8 32.1 12.9 12.1 9.9 7.4
1999 12.6 6.0 31.6 13.2 12.8 9.2 8.5
2000 12.8 5.7 30.9 14.6 12.5 11.3 8.8
2001 12.6 5.8 30.5 13.6 12.2 11.7 8.2
2002 12.3 5.3 30.1 12.5 11.8 12.0 8.3
2003 12.1 4.9 30.0 11.4 12.2 12.6 7.9
2004 12.6 5.0 30.2 11.7 12.7 13.0 9.7
(Source: Eurostat)
Table 1: Percentage of Temporary Workers
The short-run changes in wages and in other job-related characteristics of workers who experience
a shift from temporary to permanent employment is the main focus of the analysis proposed in
Section 1. In particular, one of the main predictions concerns the occurrence of a simultaneous
change in both the employer and the duration of the contract, with the worker switching from a
temporary to a permanent position. The suggested theoretical framework leads to the conclusion
that this kind of shift is associated with a reduction in the wage and a deterioration of the job
characteristics. The empirical analysis conducted in the second part of the paper tends to conrm
this conclusion, implying a short-run conrmation of the theory of compensating dierentials. Of
course this particular career prole only represents one out of a set of possible work trajectories
that a temporary worker can experience in a strictly non-competitive labour market. The proposed
model allows for a number of alternative proles, with the analytical results focusing on the short-
run features of each. Several of the theoretical implications are conrmed in the empirical analysis.
Nonetheless, the existence of a selection bias into temporary contracts can aect the validity of
the empirical results, suggesting that unobserved characteristics can have a predominant eect in
shaping the career trajectories of non-permanent workers.
The paper is organised as follows. In the next section I outline the theoretical framework
employed to describe the career trajectories of temporary and permanent workers. Sections 2 and
3 include a description of the data and the results from the empirical analysis. Section 4 concludes.
41 The Model
The analysis focuses on the rst two periods of a potentially innite horizon. The labour market
is a duopoly and can be spatially represented as a mile-long line. There are two identical rms (A
and B) in the market, respectively located at each end of the line, so that the distance between
the two is equal to 1. In contrast to most of the relevant literature (see, among several others,
Hotelling (1929), Bhaskar and To (1999), Bhaskar and To (2003), Bhaskar, A.Manning, and To
(2002), Kaas and Madden (2008)8) workers are not uniformly distributed along the line; yet, they
are pooled in a city (c), located between the two rms. The city is closer to rm A than to rm
B. For the moment, this is the only asymmetry between the two rms. Following Manning (2004),
I will assume that workers cannot change their residential location.9 The market is represented in
Fig.1.
Workers are characterized by a utility function which depends on the wage and commuting
distance. In line with Manning (2003) I hypothesize the following linear relation:
Ui(w;d) = wnet
i = wi   di (1)
where wi is the wage of worker i, di is the distance between worker i's residential location and the
rm and  2 [0;1] measures the cost of commuting. When unemployed, workers have a reservation
wage r = di. Workers are heterogeneous as each of them is endowed with a certain ability level i.
At the beginning of period t = 0 the ability of the workers is not perfectly observable. Firms receive
a noisy signal of the ability of the workers and rank them on the basis of the expected ability, that
is assumed to be uniformly distributed in an interval between (1   c) and 1.
8For a general discussion on Hotelling's model and its extensions, see Tirole (1988), chapters 2 and 7.
9See Manning (2004), pag.7. As suggested by the same author, it can be interesting to introduce the possibility of
a change in residential location, including some xed moving costs. Glaeser and Kohlhase (2003) show some evidence






Figure 1: The Market
51.1 The Firms' Strategy in the First Period: Competition or Collusion?
Both rms produce an identical, homogeneous good making use of labour only, according to the
following production function:
Yj( ;L) =  jL

j ; j = A;B (2)
where Lj is the number of workers hired by rm j and  j indicates their average ability. The rms'
production function is characterized by decreasing returns to scale. The term  j operates as a
magnifying factor, so that the total level of productivity of the rm directly depends on the ability
of its employees.
The rms' strategy is dened by a contract which species the wage and the length of the
employment period. The duration of the contract can be either innite, in case of a permanent
contract, or equal to one period of time in the case of a temporary one.10 Given the impossibility for
the rms to observe the actual ability of the workers, at the beginning of period 0 all the workers are
hired with a temporary contract.11 Firms can oer a worker a temporary contract only once. If a
worker is kept for more than one period he must be oered a permanent contract at the beginning of
the second period. A worker employed on a permanent position will change her wage only through
to internal bargaining process which takes place within the rm. In particular, I will assume that
in every period the wage of worker i will be increased by a factor t.
The two rms, receiving the same signals, rank the workers in the same way and may compete
in order to guarantee themselves the best L individuals. Such a competition process starts with
both rms oering workers the wages that make them indierent between working or remaining
unemployed, i.e. w = c for rm A and w = (1   c) for rm B. Nonetheless, each rm has
an incentive to deviate from this strategy, oering workers with relatively high expected ability an
amount of money above the indierence wage so as to attract them toward itself. The maximum
wage the rms can oer will be bounded above by the worker's ability:
w
j
i = i   di (3)
with j = A;B
10For a similar assumption, see Berton and Garibaldi (2006).
11This assumption mimics what is suggested by Blanchard and Landier (2001), p. 5.
6This competition \ a la Bertrand" leads to a unique outcome: Firm A will hire the best L
workers.12 The dierence in the commuting time workers have to face can be exploited by rm
A in order to systematically oer potential employers a slightly higher wage compared to rm B.
Hence, denoting the productivity of the best worker as ~ , the maximum wage rm B will be able
to oer is:
wB = ~    (1   c) (4)
and it will always be overcome by rm A's oer:
wA = ~    (1   c) +  (5)
with A nding such a strategy protable as long as:  < (1   2c).
If we dene as  the threshold value which indicates the productivity level of the less productive


























B   (1   c)LB (7)
where the dierence in the wages paid by the two rms is due to the fact that once rm A has
cleared the market from the top workers, rm B is able to hire the \second best" group of workers,
by oering them the indierence wage.
The outlined framework illustrates but one of the two options faced by the rms. They can in
fact nd it protable to refrain from competing over the best L workers. In particular rm A may
decide to opt out of the competition in case the cost in terms of wages overcomes the benet due to
a higher productivity level. If this is the case, both rms will oer the top quality workers a wage









A   cLA (8)
12The described mechanism can only work if the two rms perfectly observe the oers received by the worker. In
this respect, see Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002).









B   (1   c)LB (9)
Firm B certainly benets from such a strategy, for Coll
0;B being always larger than 
Comp
0;B as


























2 and g = (1   c).
Plugging these values into the objective functions we obtain that rm A will decide to compete











The economic interpretation of the above condition is straightforward. The ratio on the left hand
side of the equation can be seen as the benet the rm gets in terms of productivity from hiring
\rst best workers" instead of workers which might lie on any point of the ability line. Conversely,
the term on the right hand side is the ratio between the marginal cost of hiring the top workers
under competition and the marginal cost in case of collusion. Firm A will opt for competition as
long as the benet of such a choice overcomes its cost. Rewriting eq. 12 in a dierent way, we can












From equation 13 we can easily detect that the term raised at the power of  is larger than 1 if
8Figure 2:  as  and  Vary
F > . In this case the function  is monotonically decreasing in , which implies that a higher
marginal productivity of the workers reduces the scope for competition. According to the rst
derivative of  with respect to , the function is increasing in the ability level of the best workers
as long as the following condition holds:







Hence competition is worthwhile only if the dierence in the ability level between the best workers
and the others is relatively large. Figure 2 shows the behaviour of  as a function of  and .
1.2 Second Period
In this section, it will be assumed that in the rst period the rms compete for the best L workers
( > 0). In this case, we observe that at the end of the rst period, rm A hires the best L
A
9workers at a wage equal to

1+
2   (1   c)

, while B can hire the \second best" group L
B at a
wage equal to (1   c).
In contrast to the previous period, the ability of the workers hired by rm j in period t = 0 is
now perfectly observed by the rm j (but not by the other) and, for some workers, the actual ability
level can be dierent from the expected one. Dening the realized ability level as ^ i, this value can
only be included within two ranges: ^ i 2 [;1) or ^ i 2 ((1   c);]. This ability is imperfectly
observable by the rm not employing the worker, so that for a worker initially employed by rm j,
(j = A; B), rm k (k = B; A) will observe:
~ i; k = k  i + (1   k)  ^ i;  2 (0;1): (15)
The perceived ability can then be seen as a linear combination of the ability perceived in period
t = 0 and the observed ability with weights equal to . Given this assumption the changes in the
employment possibilities faced by the workers between the two rms in period t = 1 can now be
studied.
1.2.1 Workers' Transition between Firms: From Firm A to Firm B
Once the ability of a worker is perfectly observed, rms can compare his revealed ability with the
expected one and decide whether keeping him is protable. Firm A will keep all the workers whose
actual ability level is at least higher than  and dismiss the others, which can therefore be hired
by rm B. Firm B, instead, can potentially keep all its workers (because all workers will reveal an
ability higher than (1   c)), but any of its workers with a true ability higher than  can now be
attracted by rm A. The remaining of this section will be devoted to the study of the movements
of the workers form one rm to the other.
The analysis initially focuses on rm B. Assume that a share lBLB (0  l  1) of workers are
revealed as having an ability level ^ i > . A fraction (1 A) of these workers can be hired by rm
A, as their perceived ability is higher than the critical threshold . The remaining (1 (1 A)lB)LB
workers are kept by rm B, under a permanent contract, with a wage w1;B = (1   c) + .
Simultaneously, rm B will (imperfectly) observe the ability of the workers hired by A in period
t = 0. Assuming that a share lALA of these workers reveal a true ability level ^ i < , rm A will
10make them redundant. All these workers are now employable by B which, nonetheless, may still
presume an ability above the threshold for a share B of them. Given this belief, the best strategy
for B consists in oering a proportion BlALA of the new workers a permanent contract, in order
to prevent them from possibly rejoining rm A in period t = 2. For simplicity, I will assume that
the wage oered to those workers is going to be identical to the one oered to the other permanent
employees, including the tenure premium, . It is important to note that for  \small" rm B has
nothing to lose from this strategy: if the actual ability of the worker matches the expected one, B
has gained in productivity by having hired a worker whose ability is above  and therefore above
the average ability of B's workers.13 If the ability is proven to be dierent from the expected one
and below  (as it should be, given the performance of these workers in rm A), rm B still gains,
as it pays the reservation wage to workers whose ability is still above (1   c). The remaining
(1   B)lALA workers laid o by A can be hired by B according to the \temporary and then
permanent" scheme, guaranteeing them the reservation wage.
B's problem consists now in deciding whether to hire the workers made redundant by A. If B







L0;B(1   (1   A)lB)

(L0;B(1   (1   A)lB))+




1;B = p 	X

0;B   d X0;B: (17)
where the term 	 summarises the average ability of the X workers that remain at B after the rst
period (i.e., the initial LB minus the share (1 A)lBLB which are now hired by A) and d indicates
the labour cost.
Conversely, the prot function in case B decides to hire all the workers characterized, by an ability
level i >  can be written as:
13B will not lose from hiring the worker with a permanent contract as long as  < ~    (1   c). The assumption
that the return to seniority is relatively small is not particularly problematic taking into account some of the results
empirically obtained in the relevant literature. In particular the reference here is to Altonji and Shakotko (1987) and













(L0;B(1   (1   A)lB) + lAL0;A) +
  ((1   c) + )(L0;B(1   (1   A)lB) + lAL0;A)

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(L0;B(1   (1   A)lB) + lAL0;A) +
  ((1   c) + )(L0;B(1   (1   A)lB))   (1   c)lAL0;A

(18)












where NA indicates the newly hired workers previously employed by A, whose average ability is
equal to   for a share B or  for a share (1   B).
If we summarize the previous equation as:
h
1;B = BZ1 + (1   B)Z2 (20)
and we compare it with eq. 17, we nd that rm B will opt for hiring the lAL0;A workers coming







The general conditions under which the above inequality can be satised are reported in Ap-
pendix 1. For instance, if  is small enough (and the dierence between the ability level expected
in the st period and that one observed by rm A is large), the term on the RHS of 21 is negative,
so that the previous inequality is satised and rm B always hires the workers coming from A. On
the other hand, it can be proved that for 0 < RHS < 1 only new temporary workers can be hired
12with B not incurring in any losses.
1.2.2 From rm B to rm A
In comparison to the situation discussed in the previous paragraph, the potential changes in em-
ployment status and employer for the individuals employed by B in t = 0 are characterized by
slightly dierent patterns.
At the beginning of period t = 1, rm A lays o a share lAL0;A of the previously hired workers,
whose observed ability is below the initial threshold . Workers whose observed ability is conrmed
to be within the interval  2 [;1] get a permanent contact, enjoying the \tenure premium" . A's
















where the term ^ i indicates the observed ability level of worker i. We can rewrite the above equation
as:
n




0;A   (1   c) + )X0;A: (23)
Firm A can change this prot function by hiring the share of workers previously employed by B
and which have revealed an ability ^   . If worker i reveals an ability ^ i  , rm A will perceive
an ability:
~ i = A  i + (1   A)  ^ i: (24)
Yet, in contrast to the previous case, if rm A believes that worker i is actually characterized
by an ability level equal to the one forecast at t = 0 it will refrain from hiring him, so that the
prot function will remain the one outlined in equations 22 and 23. The prot function in case A
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which I will rewrite as:
h
A = p(
0;A + 0;A)(X0;A + N0;B)   (
0;A   (1   c) + )X0;A   (0;A   (1   c))N0;B: (26)
Comparing the above expression with its counterpart for rm B, eq. 19, we note that the wage
potentially oered to lBLB depends on the ability of these workers. A hires the N0;B workers with a
temporary contract, in order not to keep them in case they reveal an ability which is actually below
the original A's threshold . Of course such a strategy will be implemented as long as the prot
function outlined in eq. 26 overcomes the one presented in eq. 23, i.e as long as (1 A)h
A  An
A.










Given A 2 [0;1], assuming h
A > 0 and n
A > 0, the larger the dierence between h
A and n
A, the
wider the range of values for which the above inequality is satised. It is evident that condition 3
would automatically be satised in case h
A > 0, n
A < 0 and jh
Aj > jn
Aj. Inverting the previous
inequalities would instead lead to a situation in which RHS < 0, ruling out any new hiring from
A.
Tables 2 and 3 summarize the outcomes of the changes in term of contracts and utility implied
by the model. In particular, Table 2 shows that the way each rm perceives the ability of workers
initially hired by its competitor is crucial in determining the set of new contracts in period t = 1.
These perceptions (represented in the model by the probabilities A and B) will determine whether
the workers will be oered a new job and, at least with respect to those individuals that will join
14Initial Ability Ability Ability Contract Contract
Ability in t=1 Perceived Perceived in t=0 in t=1
by A by B
Temp. Perm.
1   i  1   ^ i  1 ^ i irrelevant at A at A
Prob. B: Temp. Perm.
2   i  1 (1   c)  ^ i   ^ i ~ i >  at A at B
Prob (1   B): Temp. Temp.
3   i  1 (1   c)  ^ i   ^ i (1   c)  ~ i   at A at B
Temp. Perm.
4 (1   c)  i   (1   c)  ^ i   irrelevant ^ i at B at B
Prob. A: Temp. Perm.
5 (1   c)  i     ^ i  1 ~    ^ i at B at B
Prob. (1   A): Temp. Temp.
6 (1   c)  i     ^ i  1 ~    ^ i at B at A
Table 2: Changes of Contract from t=0 to t=1
rm B in the second period, whether the new contract will be on a temporary or a permanent
basis.
Workers experiencing a change in their employment status observe a change in their wages and
commuting times. Taking into account the analysis of these elements outlined in the previous
paragraphs and the utility function presented in equation 1 we can summarise these changes in
terms of modications of the utility of the workers. Table 3 illustrate these results. Evidently,
workers moving from B to A experience a positive change in their utility, since their wage will
be related to their ability and shift above the reservation one, while their commuting time will be
reduced. A worker hired by B at time t = 0 only moves to A if the premium he gets in terms of
the ability related wage overcomes the loss of the permanent premium i.e., if ~ i   2(1   c)  .
Conversely, those moving from A to B are subject to a negative change (by construction it must
be true that   i). This last change, as we have seen, can be associated to a simultaneous shift
from a temporary to a permanent position. The model suggests that this trajectory is associated
with a cost: the worker enters the new career with a permanent job but has to face a reduced wage
and a higher travel-to-work time. Section 3 is devoted to the empirical analysis of the eects on
workers' career prole of the changes in wages and commuting time outlined in Table 3.
15Initial Final Initial Final Total Net
Contract Contract Wage Wage Change Eect
1 Temp. at A Perm. at A i   (1   c) ^ i   (1   c) ^ i   i +  Unknown
+
2 Temp. at A Temp. at B i   (1   c) (1   c) 2(1   c)   i Negative
3 Temp. at A Perm. at B i   (1   c) (1   c) +  2(1   c) Negative
 i + 
4 Temp. at B Perm. at B (1   c) (1   c) +   Positive
5 Temp. at B Temp. at A (1   c) ~ i   (1   c) ~ i   2(1   c) Positive
Table 3: Changes in the Utility Function
2 The Dataset and Some Basic Facts
The dataset I use for analysing the predictions of the model is based on the UK Labour Force
Survey and covers an eleven-year period, from 1994 to 2004. The Labour Force Survey (LFS) is
a quarterly sample survey of households living in the United Kingdom. Every individual in the
sample is generally interviewed for 5 quarters in a row before leaving the sample. It is possible to
identify individuals across dierent quarters14. All the data employed in the present analysis refer
to the September-November quarters. In those surveys the standard variables describing workers'
socio-demographic characteristics (such as age, sex, education, type of employment and so on) are
complemented with other sets of information of particular interest for our purposes, as, for example,
the variables which refer to commuting time. In this paper I focus on individuals in their rst and
fth quarters, so that every respondent (and every variable referring to him) is observed twice,
with a one-year lag between the rst and the second interview. The resulting dataset includes
36,801 male workers, aged from 16 to 65 years, with an average of 3,700 individuals per year. As
it is observed that for women temporary contracts are very often oered in combination with part-
time arrangements, typically established to better t the career plans of working mothers, females
workers are not included in the sample in order to avoid over-representing part-time workers. The
total percentage of temporary workers is 5.48, corresponding to 2,017 workers. This gure includes
ve dierent kinds of workers: (1) seasonal workers, (2) people under contract for a xed period,
14Detailed information about the UK Labour Force Survey can be found in the web sites:
http://www.statistics.gov.uk/ and http://www.data-archive.ac.uk/.
16Figure 3: Hourly Gross Wage
(3) workers on agency temping, (4) workers employed in a casual type of work in the reference week
and (5) any other not permanent employee. In all the years under analysis, workers under contract
for a xed period account for half of the temporary share, with casual work being the second most
common kind of employment (around 20% of temporary workers belong to this category). Table
4 summarizes most of the relevant information on the personal characteristics of the individuals
included in the sample.
These gures suggest a denition of temporary workers in line with the relevant literature
in terms of age, education and job characteristics and we can observe that the average wage of
temporary workers signicantly diers from that of the permanent ones. In order to isolate the
pure eect on hourly wages of holding a dierent type of contract a propensity score matching
procedure has been implemented, according to relying on a nearest-neighbour matching method
and basing the estimation on a set variables that summarise both individual and job characteristics
(Leuven and Sianesi (2003)).15 The result of this analysis is shown in Fig. 3.
It can been seen that the wage distribution (dotted line) of temporary workers signicantly
15In particular the employed variables are: age, race, marital status, number of children, education level, managerial
status, union membership, rm size, sector and region of work, full-time or part-time status. For a theoretical
discussion on propensity score matching see Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) and Caliendo and Hujer (2006). An




Number of Observations 34734 (94.52%) 2017 (5.48%)
Commuting Time 27.19 24.54 29.94 39.43









Not Married 35.63 55.88
Education
Univ. Degree 15.30 17.39
High Educ. 11.38 11.02
A-level 7.48 9.90
O-level 28.19 32.73
Basic Educ. 27.14 19.71
No Educ 10.51 9.25
Work Characteristics
Part-Time 6.54 32.61





more than 25 71.16 72.37
(Source: LFS, 1994-2004, std. dev. in italics)
The commuting time is calculated on the base of the following question:
\How long in total does it usually take you to travel from home to work?"
Table 4: Sample Descriptive Statistics
diers from that of the permanent ones. This result is two-folded. On the one hand, it is in line
with most of the relevant literature on the economics of temporary contracts; on the other, it leads
one to question the degree of competitiveness of the labour market and the opportunity to rely on
the theory of equalizing dierences, at least with respect to the relation between wages and contract
duration.
18Regarding the link between wages and commuting time, a few aspects are worth noting from
the analysis of Table 4 and Figure 3:
1. On average commuting time is shorter for permanent workers than for temporary ones. The
average for permanents is: 27.19 minutes per day, while for temporaries is 29.94. The dierence
is statistically signicant at the 95% level of condence;
2. The dierence between the average wages of temporary workers and permanent ones is statis-
tically signicant. This result holds for if we restrict our attention to the dierence between
permanent workers and the matched temporary ones.
3 Empirical Results
3.1 The relation between wage and commuting time
As mentioned at the end of Section 1, the empirical analysis presented in this section will be devoted
to the study of the relation between wages and commuting time for those individuals that, during
the period of observation, have experienced a change in the type of their contract (permanent or
temporary) and/or in their employer.
We noted that the model predicts a negative change in wages for workers moving from rm A
to rm B and a positive one for those experiencing the opposite shift. Furthermore, it also suggests
that a simultaneous change of employer and contractual status can only be achieved by (some of
the) workers moving from A to B, individuals moving from B to A are always oered a temporary
contract. Table 5 shows the results of a rst level of investigation into this relation. Column 1
presents the estimates of a standard OLS procedure in which the logarithm of the gross hourly
wage is regressed against several variables controlling for personal and work related characteristics,
including commuting time. The high degree of endogeneity that link wages and commuting time
would make any causal interpretation of the coecient extremely fragile; in this sense the presented
coecients are only indicative of the extent of the correlation between wage and the independent
variables. In the second column the set of regressors is augmented by a number of dummy variables
in order to control for the race of the individual, sector and year xed eects. The analysis is
then repeated in columns three and four on temporary workers only. Focusing on the coecients
related to travel-to-work time, the positive relation between this variable and the dependent one
19All Workers Temporary Workers
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Commuting Time 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Age 0.068 0.063 0.071 0.066
(0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.007)
Age2 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Education 0.101 0.094 0.089 0.088
(0.002) (0.002) (0.010) (0.011)
Tenure 0.013 0.014 0.038 0.038
(0.001) (0.001) (0.009) (0.009)
Tenure2 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.038
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Marital Status 0.082 0.098 0.067 0.084
(0.006) (0.006) (0.039) (0.040)
Managerial Duties 0.303 0.293 0.105 0.294
(0.007) (0.006) (0.056) (0.059)
Union Member 0.024 0.045 0.105 0.125
(0.006) (0.006) (0.038) (0.039)
Full-time Part-time -0.137 -0.079 -0.061 -0.045
(0.011) (0.011) (0.034) (0.036)
Intercept -0.034 0.816 -0.301 -0.452
(0.035) (0.206) (0.141) (0.343)
N 29848 29635 1556 1523
R2 0.448 0.494 0.367 0.407
F 2198.272 600.913 81.231 21.052
Other Controls No Yes No Yes
Signicance levels:  : 10%  : 5%    : 1% ;
Standard Errors into brackets
Other controls are: 7 race dummies, 10 sector dummies, 10 year dummies
Table 5: OLS Relation Wage and Commuting Time
is in line with that already found by Manning (2004) in terms of sign and signicance. The main
point of interest is certainly given by the lack of a statistically signicant relation between wages and
commuting time for temporary workers, when the whole set of controls is included. At rst sight, the
estimated parameter goes against the theory of compensating dierentials. As noted in the previous
section, non permanent employees earn signicantly less than their permanent counterparts, but
no evidence of compensation in terms of other working characteristics can be detected at this basic
level of investigation.16
Table 6 presents the results from the study of a linear model in which the log of hourly wages
16The size of the coecient appears to be smaller comparing to that suggested by Manning. The choice of the set
of control variables may be the main source of dierentiation among the results.
20is regressed against the same set of regressors presented in the previous table augmented by some
interaction terms. The aim of these new terms lies in capturing the changes in wages related to the
changes in the employment status suggested by the proposed model and summarised in Table 3.
The specication under analysis can be summarized by the following equation which is initially
estimated through OLS:
ln(wi) =  + Ii + 
Xi + Di + i (28)
where X and D respectively are the matrices of covariates and dummy variables already presented
in Table 5, while I includes a number of interaction terms aimed at capturing the multiplicity of
changes suggested by the model. The four columns of Table 6 present the estimated results based
on dierent specications of equation 28, depending on the interaction variables included in the set
of regressors. Explicitly, when all the interaction terms are included, equation 28 can be expressed
as:
ln(wi) =  + 
1 Commuting Timei + 1 Different Employeri + 2 Temp: Contracti+





k=1 kDECTi;k + 
Xi + i
(29)
where the term CDE indicates two interaction terms capturing the changes in employer associated
with a change from a temporary to a permanent position or with a movement from a temporary
to another temporary contract. The term DECT denotes a set of four variables that indicate
whether the simultaneous changes in employer and contract are linked to a decrease or an increase
in commuting time. The two variables included in CDE and the four comprised in DECT are
mutually exclusive but not collectively exhaustive with respect of the entire set of workers included
in the sample. The coecients obtained in the proposed regressions are interpreted keeping the set
of workers that do not experience a change in the contract as the comparison group.
The rst row of the table shows that the evidence of a relevant penalty in terms of wages for
temporary workers presented in the previous section tends to vanish as more variables are taken
into consideration. In all four suggested specications no statistically signicant relation can be
found between the salary obtained by a worker and his being employed under a non-permanent
scheme (note, nonetheless, that the signs of the estimated parameters are consistently negative
21Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Temporary Contract -0.0298 -0.0328 -0.0293 -0.0307
(-0.88) (-0.96) (-0.86) (-0.89)
Commuting Time 0.0018*** 0.0018*** 0.0018*** 0.0018***
(13.01) (13.00) (12.57) (12.55)
Interaction Temp - Comm. Time -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003
(-0.34) (-0.36) (-0.36) (-0.36)
Dierent Employer -0.0005 0.0080 0.0035 0.0066
(-0.06) (0.89) (0.39) (0.73)
From Temp to Perm. -0.0132 0.0446** 0.0280 0.0440**
(-0.75) (2.06) (1.35) (2.01)
From Temp to Temp 0.0171 0.0293 0.0209 0.0305
(0.49) (0.75) (0.54) (0.78)
Inter. Temp-Perm Di. Employer -0.148*** -0.140**
(-4.13) (-2.23)
Inter. Temp-Temp Di. Employer -0.0280 -0.0726
(-0.54) (-0.68)
Inter. Temp-Perm Di. Employer -0.157*** -0.0356
With Positive Change in Comm. Time (-3.27) (-0.49)
Inter. Temp-Perm Di. Employer -0.0988* 0.0231
With Negative Change in Comm. Time (-1.88) (0.31)
Inter. Temp-Temp Di. Employer -0.0216 0.0405
With Positive Change in Comm. Time (-0.35) (0.35)
Inter. Temp-Temp Di. Employer -0.0189 0.0432
With Negative Change in Comm. Time (-0.24) (0.35)
Constant 0.0560 0.0578 0.678*** 0.679***
(0.63) (0.65) (2.63) (2.63)
R2 0.463 0.463 0.465 0.465
Adjusted R2 0.461 0.462 0.464 0.464
Observations 26863 26863 26528 26528
Signicance levels:  : 10%  : 5%    : 1%; t-statistics into brackets
Table 6: OLS Relation Wage Interaction Terms
across the dierent columns). On the contrary, commuting time appears to be systematically
compensated. The relevance of the explanatory power of the variable \Temporary Contract" comes
again into question observing the lack of any statistical signicance of the interaction term between
the temporary contract dummy and the amount of time-to-work faced by the sampled individuals.
Having noted that a change in employer is associated with an increase in the hourly wage, but
with a coecient which is not statistically dierent from 0, it is interesting to see that in the second
and in the fourth specication the change from a temporary to a permanent position also goes
22together with an increase in the wage. In this sense it is extremely relevant that this last result is
overruled when the change in contract length (from temporary to permanent) is also associated with
a change in employer. The parameter related to this variable tends to conrm the theoretical nding
summarized as point 3 in Table 3: a worker moving from one rm to another while simultaneously
shifting from a temporary to a permanent contract should observe a reduction in his net utility, due
to a decrease in the wage. With respect to the parameter characterizing those workers keeping a
temporary job although with a dierent employer, the model suggests that the net result of such a
change in terms of worker utility depends on the direction of the change of employer, whether toward
or from the rm closer to the city. Columns 3 and 4 of Table 6 investigate these shifts. In column 3,
the interaction terms between changes in contracts and changes in employers are substituted by four
new variables obtained by interacting the dropped variables with two dummies indicating a positive
or a negative change in the commuting time between periods t and t   1. The results previously
presented with respect to workers which have experienced a shift from a temporary to a permanent
contract tend to be reinforced. Changes from temporary to permanent with a simultaneous increase
in commuting time are still related to a decrease in wage, consistent with an overall reduction in
workers' utility. With respect to those workers who have changed employers but still work under
temporary contracts, the proposed regression does not suggest a clear-cut pattern of modications
in terms of wages. The coecients of these terms are in fact not statistically dierent from 0 and
show a negative sign, while the coecient of the dummy for a simple change from a temporary
contract to another temporary contract is positive, although also not signicant.
The nal column of Table 6 presents the results of the regression in which all possible interaction
terms and variables are included in the set of regressors. The estimates once more conrm the main
ndings of the previous stages: the hourly wage appears to be positively correlated with an increase
in commuting time and with a shift from temporary to permanent jobs, in line with that suggested
by the theory of compensated dierentials on the one hand and by a consistent amount of literature
on temporary contracts on the other 17. Nonetheless, also in this specication the parameter
relating wages to a simultaneous change in employer and from temporary to permanent status is
negative and statistically signicant. Once more the pattern suggested by the model, in which a
rm is able to attract workers from the other rm even if changing job implies a decrease in his
17See, for example, Bentolila and Dolado (1994), Guell and Petrongolo (2000), Booth, Francesconi, and Frank
(2002).
23Temporary Temp to Perm Temp to Perm Temp to Perm
Di. Empl. Di. Empl.
Pos. Change
Dep Variable: Wage
ATT -0.142*** -0.101*** -0.198*** -0.214***
(-7.38) (-3.77) (-5.57) (-4.31)
Observations 29627 27045 26863 26863
Dep Variable:
Comm. Time
ATT 3.291*** 2.156* 4.739**
(3.81) (1.69) (2.35)
Observations 29627 27045 26863
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0:1, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01
Table 7: Propensity Score Matching Estimates
short run utility tends to be conrmed. It is important to underline that several of the implications
suggested by the model, including the one discussed above directly come from the strong assumption
of a \duopsonistic"market. Yet, the consequences of the introduction of this hypothesis, leading
toward a framework in which the best (in terms of commuting time) rm can easily attract all the
best workers while the other rm can still pay its employees the reservation wage only, appear to
be at least partially conrmed by the empirical analysis presented in this section. In particular
the relations between a simultaneous change of employer and of contract duration and worker's
utility move in the direction predicted by the theory and give the hypothesis of the existence of a
non-competitive labour market some support.
3.2 Selection bias and changes in the contracts.
The bulk of the proposed analysis focuses on the parameters referring to those workers who have
experienced a change in their contract, having started their career on a temporary position. This
fact suggests the need for an investigation of the presence of sample selection bias.18 In this respect,
two dierent empirical strategies are implemented. First of all, Table 7 presents the results obtained
by performing a propensity score matching procedure on the data employed for the OLS regressions
presented in the previous pages.
The proposed estimates summarize the average treatment eects on the treated individuals on
the two critical variables, wage and commuting time. The parameters are estimated using propensity
18A good review of applied methods in labour economics is given by Picchio (2006).
24score matching across the list of variables already used in the previously presented regressions.19
The four columns present the results depending on the variable chosen for the treatment: holding
a temporary contract, having shifted from a temporary to a permanent contract, having performed
this last change in employment status with a simultaneous change in employer and nally with the
simultaneous change is employer and status is associated with a positive change in commuting time.
The comparison group is based on the set of all the workers that do experience the treatment. The
coecients are in line with what already suggested by the OLS procedure. The penalty in terms
of wages and time-to-work experienced by the temporary workers is clearly highlighted and the
prediction of a lack of immediate compensation as the worker experiences a change in his job status
nds an empirical conrmation20.
An extra step can be taken in order to address the issue of selection bias in the regression
analysis. The reference in this case is to the two-step procedure suggested by Heckman (1979).
Table 8 presents the results of the second stage, where the dependent variable is still given by the
logarithm of the hourly wage, while the rst stage analyzes the probability of holding a temporary
contract at time t 1. The variables used of the rst stage are related to the personal characteristics
of the individuals and are not included in the second stage. The results of the rst stage are presented
in Table 9 in Appendix 2.21
Two main results emerge from the presented estimates; rst of all, the role of selection into
temporary employment appears empirically relevant in determining the wage of the worker. In
particular, the inverse Mills ratio () is systematically statistically signicant and the sign charac-
terizing the coecient  (that is, the correlation between the error terms of the rst and second
stage equations) suggests that the unobservable characteristics linked to each of the two stages of
the analysis are positively correlated. Secondly, none of the explanatory variables meant to capture
the changes in the labour status of the individual are signicant anymore. It appears evident that
as far as the observable characteristics only are taken into consideration, the predictions obtained
through the simple theoretical analysis proposed in Section 1 are at least partially conrmed, even if
19The procedure employed in obtaining the estimates is based on Abadie, Herr, Imbens, and Drukker (2004); the
(one-to-one) matching is exact with respect to age and education.Matching with up to 5 matches per observation
has been implemented, obtaining results that are very close to those presented in Table 7.
20The missing parameter in the fourth column of Table 7 and related to Commuting Time is not presented as
it would not be informative. As the focus of the fourth column is to investigate the propensity score matching
with respect to those workers that have experienced a positive change in commuting time within the two periods of
observation, the estimated parameter would be by construction positive, statistically signicant and much larger in
relative size with respect to the other coecients presented in the same table.
21The presented number of observations refers to both stages.
25(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log of Hourly Wage
Commuting Time 0.0023*** 0.0026*** 0.0027*** 0.0027***
(3.08) (3.09) (3.12) (3.10)
Interaction Temp - Comm. Time -0.0006 -0.0012 -0.0013 -0.0013
(-0.82) (-1.13) (-1.19) (-1.17)
Dierent Employer -0.0408 -0.0243 -0.0437 -0.0213
(-1.20) (-0.05) (-1.02) (-0.43)
From Temp to Perm. -0.0108 -0.0300 -0.0154
(-0.22) (-0.63) (-0.31)
Inter. Temp-Perm Di. Employer -0.0691 -0.0798
(-1.09) (-0.87)
Inter. Temp-Perm Di. Employer -0.0353 0.0152
With Positive Change in Comm. Time (-0.54) (0.17)
Inter. Temp-Perm Di. Employer 0.0235 0.0741
With Negative Change in Comm. Time (0.33) (0.80)
Constant 0.850*** 0.859*** 0.867*** 0.868***
(4.78) (4.82) (4.84) (4.84)
 0.218*** 0.217*** 0.225*** 0.224***
(4.95) (4.92) (5.00) (4.98)
 0.413 0.412 0.425 0.424
 0.529 0.528 0.528 0.528
Observations 35165 35165 35135 35135
Signicance levels:  : 10%  : 5%    : 1%; t-statistics into brackets
Other controls are: 7 race dummies, 10 sector dummies, 10 year dummies
Table 8: Heckman Procedure - Second Stage
the occurrence of selection into temporary work in t 1 is controlled for. The picture changes when
the unobservable characteristics are taken into account. The explanatory power of the dummies
representing the changes in working status tends to decrease; this pattern appears to be common
to all the relevant variables included in the study presented in this section, with the only excep-
tion of commuting time, which still shows a positive and signicant relation with the wages of the
sampled individuals. The eective applicability of the theory of compensating dierential beyond
the relation wage-commuting time is extremely complicated in this context, as the short-run wage
prole of the workers appears heavily in
uenced by unobserved characteristics.
4 Conclusions
This paper addresses the applicability of the theory of equalizing dierences in a market in which
temporary and permanent workers co-exist. Most of the existing literature on temporary employ-
26ment presents empirical evidence that cannot be easily reconciled with the hypothesis of perfect
competition in the labour market and with the assumption of compensating dierentials as implied
by Rosen (1987). In particular, temporary workers seem to face worse job conditions in terms of
wages and travel-to-work distance with respect to their permanent counterparts. This mere obser-
vation was taken as a starting point for the development of a simple two-period model based on
a duopsonistic labour market, in which workers are characterized by heterogeneous ability level,
rms can oer either temporary or permanent contracts and the only original source of asymmetry
between the employers is given by the dierence in commuting time workers have to face in order
to reach the rm. Letting rms Bertrand compete for the best (in terms of ability) workers on a
two-period time basis leads to the denition of a number of career proles. In particular, the model
suggests that workers who have been employed on a temporary basis for a rm can subsequently
get a permanent job from the other employer under the condition of a lower wage and a longer
travel-to-work distance. The opposite patterns in terms of salary and commuting time characterize
the individuals that change employer but are still hired on a temporary basis.
All these predictions are then empirically analysed by testing a reduced form of the model. In
this respect, the last two sections of the paper are devoted to an empirical study of data from the
UK Labour Force Survey, covering an eleven-year period, 1994 to 2004. The focus is on the wages
and commuting times of those individuals who have experienced a change in their labour condition
during the two periods of analysis. The results of the study, conducted via the inclusion of several
interaction terms in the set of regressors explaining the dierences in wages across a the two periods,
tend to partially conrm the conclusions suggested by the model. In particular, for those individuals
simultaneously experiencing a change in employer and shifting from a temporary to a permanent
contract the results of the proposed regressions lead to a well dened pattern characterized by a
reduction in the wage corresponding to a simultaneous increase in travel-to-work distance. This
result can nd a justication in the degree of risk aversion of the workers, which might be willing to
trade wage for employment certainty. Nonetheless, in the context of the present work, this outcome
is entirely driven by the limited amount of competition that characterizes a labour market in which
workers play a passive role in the shaping of their contracts. The robustness of the coecients
is tested through dierent econometric procedures, which suggest that the role of unobservable
characteristics in the selection into temporary employment can play an considerable role in the
27determination of the wage patterns of an individual and reduce the importance of the changes in
employer and contract duration in shaping the short-run career trajectory of a worker.
As some of the theoretical predictions cannot be fully conrmed by the proposed empirical
analysis, this paper can be seen as rst step in a more complicated and general analysis of the
dierences between temporary and permanent workers. Several theoretical aspects still deserve to
be fully investigated, with particular reference to a complete characterization of the career prole of
the workers experiencing more than one consecutive spell in temporary employment. With respect
to the empirical results, the issue of the eect of unobservable characteristics in the selection into
temporary work remains open to further investigation and may constitute a substantial starting
point for a new applied study of the features related to dierent job schemes.
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Proof of Condition 1


























that we can more simply rewrite as:

Comp
0;A = pFH   (F   g)H (30)
Coll
0;A = pDH   cH (31)























































































































































































 p (	B + B) (X0;B + N0;A)   dX0;B   (1   c)N0;A
p (	B +  B) (X0;B + N0;A)   d(X0;B + N0;A)+






0;B   (	 + )(X0;B + N0;A)] + (1   c)N0;A
p(    )(X0;B + N0;A)   N0;A
(35)
Taking into account the fact that B is to be interpreted as a probability, it must be true that
B 2 [0;1]. The RHS, on the other hand can achieve dierent values according to the specications
of the parameters aecting it. Of course observing RHS < 0 would imply that the inequality
presented in eq. 35 is always satised, while a value above 1 would automatically rule out the
possibility that rm B will hire the N0;A = hAH0;A. This last case is very simple to analyze.
RHS > 1 implies:
p[	X

0;B   (	 + )(X0;B + N0;A)] + (1   c)N0;A
p(    )(X0;B + N0;A)   N0;A
> 1
which can be rewritten as
p[(	 +  )(X0;B + N0;A)   (	X0;B)] < dN0;A
whose interpretation is straightforward: Firm B will never hire any worker from A in the case
where the total cost of hiring the new employees overcomes the revenues rm B will make in the
event the workers are believed to be highly productive.
The case RHS < 0 is satised under the condition that the numerator N and the denominator D
show a dierent sign. In particular, noting that:
	X

0;B   (	 + )(X0;B + N0;A) < 0
(    )(X0;B + N0;A) > 0
by construction, then the following conditions must hold:
p [(	 + )(X0;B + N0;A)   	X

0;B] > (1   c)N
p [(    )(X0;B + N0;A)] > N
35which imply that as long as the additional costs of the new temporary workers ((1   c)) are
below the corresponding revenue gains obtained by B, and as long as the gain from hiring perma-
nent workers instead of temporary ones overcomes the additional costs () implied by this choice,
the inequality in eq. 35 is always satised and B always hires the workers from rm A. Of course
RHS < 0 can also be the outcome of a positive numerator and a negative denominator. Nonethe-
less, if we rely on the notation introduced in Section 1.2.2, this case could be simply rewritten as
n
1;B > Z2 > Z1; Were this the case, B would simply collapse to 0 and no more workers would be
hired by B.
Finally, we can also observe 0 < RHS < 1. This case corresponds to imposing some constraints
on the dierence in the ability of the newly hired and the workers B employed in period 1. In the
case where both N and D are positive, hiring workers on the basis of the ability expected at t = 0
is more convenient than hiring them on the basis of the ability observed by A, since D> 0 implies
p [(    )(X0;B + N0;A)] > N. On the other hand, since N> 0 the gain in revenues from hiring
the workers is smaller than its cost, a(1   c)N. Hence for both N and D positive, rm B should
only hire new permanent workers. Nonetheless, this result is not feasible, since RHS < 1 leads to:
p [(	 +  )(X0;B + N0;A)   	X

0;B] < ((1   c) + )N
which implies that the cost of hiring the new permanent workers overcomes the corresponding
gain in revenues.
Applying a similar reasoning, we can see that, on the other hand, both N and D being negative
represents a condition for B for only hiring new temporary workers. In this case the fact that
RHS > 1 does not introduce any binding constraint.
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1 2 3 4
Age -0.0669*** -0.0669*** -0.0672*** -0.0672***
(-8.95) (-8.95) (-8.92) (-8.91)
Age2 0.000958*** 0.000959*** 0.000959*** 0.000959***
(10.54) (10.54) (10.45) (10.45)
Education 0.0659*** 0.0661*** 0.0663*** 0.0664***
(6.61) (6.63) (6.60) (6.61)
Tenure -0.166*** -0.166*** -0.164*** -0.164***
(-25.28) (-25.27) (-24.90) (-24.90)
Tenure2 0.00342*** 0.00342*** 0.00339*** 0.00339***
(19.06) (19.06) (18.79) (18.80)
Married -0.221*** -0.221*** -0.215*** -0.215***
(-5.97) (-5.97) (-5.72) (-5.72)
White -0.291*** -0.293*** -0.288*** -0.289***
(-3.04) (-3.06) (-2.98) (-2.99)
Black Caribbean -0.607** -0.606** -0.592** -0.591**
(-2.27) (-2.27) (-2.21) (-2.21)
Black African -0.0381 -0.0416 -0.0264 -0.0295
(-0.16) (-0.17) (-0.11) (-0.12)
Indian -0.136 -0.137 -0.143 -0.143
(-0.91) (-0.92) (-0.95) (-0.95)
Pakistani-Bangladeshi -0.219 -0.220 -0.206 -0.207
(-1.13) (-1.14) (-1.06) (-1.06)
Chinese -0.0464 -0.0469 -0.0297 -0.0320
(-0.17) (-0.17) (-0.11) (-0.12)
1994 0.273*** 0.273*** 0.278*** 0.279***
(3.87) (3.88) (3.91) (3.92)
1995 0.449*** 0.449*** 0.452*** 0.451***
(6.07) (6.08) (6.04) (6.04)
1996 0.325*** 0.326*** 0.320*** 0.321***
(4.69) (4.71) (4.56) (4.57)
1997 0.279*** 0.279*** 0.291*** 0.291***
(4.00) (4.00) (4.13) (4.13)
1998 0.313*** 0.313*** 0.324*** 0.323***
(4.55) (4.55) (4.66) (4.65)
1999 0.226*** 0.226*** 0.240*** 0.240***
(3.23) (3.23) (3.40) (3.40)
2000 0.145** 0.145** 0.139* 0.139*
(1.99) (1.99) (1.88) (1.88)
2001 0.0540 0.0541 0.0575 0.0573
(0.73) (0.73) (0.77) (0.77)
2002 0.0128 0.0121 0.0200 0.0201
(0.16) (0.15) (0.25) (0.25)
Constant -0.312* -0.310* -0.328* -0.328*
(-1.81) (-1.80) (-1.88) (-1.88)
Observations 35165 35165 35135 35135
Signicance levels :  : 10%  : 5%    : 1%
Table 9: Heckman Analysis - First Stage Probit Regression
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